# NATIONAL PROGRAMME ISF

# **IDENTIFICATION OF THE DESIGNATED AUTHORITIES**

#### Competent authorities responsible for management and control systems

Authority	Name of the authority	Name of the person responsible	Address	E-mail address	Date of	Activities
		for the authority			designation	delegated
Responsible	The Foreign Financing Department of the	Secretary General	Pikk 61	info@siseministeerium.ee	02-Jun-2015	
authority	Ministry of the Interior		Tallinn			
Audit authority	The Internal Audit Department of the	Minister of the Interior	Pikk 61	info@siseministeerium.ee		
	Ministry of the Interior		Tallinn			

#### Management and control system

The management and control system is described in the rules established for domestic implementation of the Internal Security Fund (ISF). The management and control system of the General Programme on "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows" will be taken as the basis when preparing the system. The Foreign Financing Department of the Ministry of the Interior performs the duties of the Responsible Authority (RA); head of the RA is Secretary General. The Internal Audit Department of the Ministry of the Interior. The RA and the AA fulfil the task provided in the basic acts; delegated authority will not be used.

CCI	2014EE65ISNP001
Title	Eesti National Programme ISF
Version	5.1
First year	2014
Last year	2020
Eligible from	01-Jan-2014
EC Decision Number	C(2019)8566
EC Decision Date	27-Nov-2019

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# **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

During 2013 until 2015 compiled multi-annual programme of Estonia for the implementation of the ISF (NP) supports the achievement of goals stated in national strategies: Main Guidelines of Estonia's Security Policy until 2015 (MGSP); Bases of Estonia's Security Policy; Programme to Reduce Drug Use for 2013–2016; Guidelines for Development of Criminal Policy until 2018; Action Plan of the Government of the Republic for 2011–2015 "Secure Estonia"; Development Plan for the Governing Area of the Ministry of the Interior (DPGA); Development Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 2013–2016; Development Plan for the Governing Area of the Ministry of Finance 2014–2017. By the time of the revision of the NP in 2017, some above mentioned strategies have become outdated, and successive documents, which goals are in coherence with previous strategies, have been adopted. For example Internal Security and Legal Environment" of the Action Plan of the Government of the Republic for 2015–2020, Chapter X "Internal Security and Legal Environment" of the Action Plan of the Government of the Republic for 2016–2019, Development Plan for the MFA 2017-2020. Hereinafter, these documents are not being referred to again. The measures planned in the programme must result in the increase of the state's capability in the field of visas, surveillance of the external border and border control, combating crime and crisis management.

The expected results of the actions planned in the area of visas are completion of the developments related to common Visa Information System of the European Union (VIS) in the visa register. It is important to make the procedure for the approval of issuing visas sustainable by creating a comprehensive information system. The information system helps to speed up the issuing of visas, to ensure better control and compliance with uniform principles. The priority in the area of visa procedure is ensuring the forwarding of high-quality fingerprint files to the central system of VIS. The replacement of depreciated computers of consular officials dealing with visa procedure will ensure effective and operative visa procedure. The goal of training the officials is to contribute to implementation of the EU common visa policy.

The programme provides for a number of actions that support increasing the surveillance of external borders and border control capabilities. The actions contribute to the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the improvement of information exchange in border control and surveillance, ensuring control of the external border in accordance with the common standards of the European Union (EU) and uniform application of the Schengen acquis. Large part of the measures support and expand the present national capability to manage external borders.

The expected results of the actions financed by the programme in the field of combating crime are increasing the capability of the police to handle cases of hidden and organised crimes more effectively, the effectiveness of identification and solving crimes (including improving financial investigations), the possibilities for discovering illicit goods, intensifying the prevention of terrorism and informing the public of various forms of human trafficking. The achievement of the above mentioned goals including the improvement of information exchange is supported by the developments of information and communication technologies (ICT).

In order to prevent risks and crises that endanger the population and to combat them, the programme puts emphasis on increasing the capabilities in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and elimination of danger related to bombs, i.e. the area of demining. The expected results of the actions contributing to the early warning are updating of the system of early warning in case of danger of radiation (caused by man-made crisis), improvement of capability of repulsion of cyber-attacks aimed at critical information systems of the providers of vital services, and increasing the possibilities of resolving crisis situations and resource-demanding events. The actions should also increase capability to provide danger and risk assessments related to demining incidents, and capabilities of crisis management and assessing security risks.

# 2. BASELINE SITUATION IN THE MEMBER STATE

# Summary of the current state of play as of December 2013 in the Member State for the fields relevant to the Fund

The external border of the EU in Estonia is guarded on land and in sea areas by patrols and with surveillance systems based on cordons. The land section of the external border is partly covered by electronic and technical surveillance. For the purpose of monitoring the sea area of the external border and for discovering objects, a maritime surveillance system (20 radars) is used.

Patrol activities are performed on border sections not covered by technical surveillance. There are cordons and service places for guarding the section between border points. The patrolling intensity depends on the risk assessment given to the particular border section. There are five patrol ships, four helicopters and three patrol aircrafts for patrolling the border in Estonia. On transboundary water bodies launches, motorboats and hovercrafts are used. Most of the watercrafts and land vehicles, including special transport, were procured with the support of Schengen Facility (SF) and are by now fully depreciated. The maintenance and repair expenses are high for this old equipment. Replacement of these vehicles is needed to improve the readiness of reacting to border incidents and ensures the patrolling capability. With decreasing manpower (personnel) the increased mobility of patrols from new vehicles is important, as persons crossing the border illegally use often vehicles. In order to patrol in areas with rough terrain and under difficult weather conditions (ice, snow, rain), special transport is needed (e.g. all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles, mountain bikes etc).

On the external border 43 border crossing points are open to international traffic, out of which 29 are in the sea or transboundary water bodies' ports, seven in airports, three on highway sections, two in railroad stations and in two border crossing points border crossing is only possible on foot. In 2013, the number of persons who crossed the border and went through border check was 8 142 176. The existing border check equipment which has been purchased largely before 2007 needs replacement and additional equipment is necessary for the I and II level border check. The capability of border crossing points and border guard stations to conduct document check needs to be raised. New equipment increases the quality of the border check activities, contributes to solving illegal border crossing incidents and therefore ensures security at the external border and smooth crossing of the external borders in conformity with the Schengen acquis. In 2013, 128 persons crossed the border illegally for the purpose of immigration and transit. There has been an increase in the instances of cross-border smuggling where no unlawful border crossing takes place, but goods are given or thrown across the border by carriers.

Estonia is actively contributing in the joint operations coordinated by the FRONTEX. In 2013, 71 Estonian experts took part in the operations, contributing 2260 operation days; airplane contributed 30 days and observation bus 2018 days in Bulgaria and Greece. Estonia joined the EUROSUR in November 2012.

The development of the area has among others been financed with the External Borders Fund (EBF), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the SF and the Phare programme resources. EBF support was used for the renewal and launch of Estonian SIS central system (E-SIS), SIRENE workflow system and other related information systems in connection to exchange of information with second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). Additional needs are related to the development of national IT-systems in relation to SIS II. With the support of EBF also exchanging the software and database platform of the Border Control Information System and creating the future interface possibilities with Entry/Exit System (EES) were financed.

The development of the area is based on national strategies: the MGSP and the annually renewed DPGA.

Estonia successfully passed the Schengen evaluations. The Estonian air and maritime border was assessed in 2012 and the land border in 2013. It was pointed out that the technical equipment of Estonia has reached a level that allows the border guards to fulfil their duties effectively and efficiently. In addition it was noted that the constant updating and upgrading of surveillance systems ensures the security of the external border at the required level.

128 employees in Estonian MFA are dealing with visa questions at the present moment (66 consuls, 16 expat technical staff and 46 local technical staff). In order to implement the common visa policy and the Schengen *acquis* in a correct and harmonised manner, joint training of consular, police and border guard officials and the officials of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) is needed. In 2006–2008 and in 2012, general seminars were held for all the consular officials, and in 2009–2011, regional training for consular officials of foreign representations handling visa proceedings were organised. No training to promote efficient inter-agency cooperation has been previously conducted, while the number of visa applicants is growing by 15-20% a year (202 303 visa applications were processed in the 24 foreign representations of Estonia), which requires a more innovative and professional approach towards visa proceedings, including thought-out cooperation between authorities.

The computers used in visa proceedings are obsolete and need to be replaced. The ever increasing number of visa applications poses a challenge. The majority of computers have been procured in 2005 or 2006. The currently used computers may reduce the efficiency of visa proceedings and make the use of various databases in the identification of persons difficult. In the past, computers have been replaced using SF resources.

Estonia joined VIS in 2011 and introduced the system in all of the foreign representations were visas are issued. Estonia follows the VIS Global roll-out schedule, is successfully ending the VISMail2 project and ready to adopt the VISMail2 at the end of roll-out.

No separate resources have been provided in 2013 for supporting a common visa policy. The administrative costs related to issuing visas are financed from the state budget. Visa policy activities were not financed through Estonian EBF national programme.

Combating the illicit trade in narcotics is a priority. There were 1 019 narcotics related crime detected in 2013. Additional national resources have been allocated to the Criminal Police in order to focus on serious crimes and organised groups related to narcotics. Special attention is paid to reducing the availability of strong and very strong narcotics, in order to reduce the number of fatalities caused by narcotics. The task of the specialised narcotics unit that was launched at the beginning of 2013 is to focus on primary-level drug dealers and on removing narcotic substances from street sales. The tactics of combating narcotics in regards to street dealers and organisers has been changed. There are changes in the mutual work distribution and cooperation between law enforcement, criminal police and border guard units. Efficiency of cooperation with various partners (e.g. the Tax and Customs Board) was increased. As a result of the cooperation the profiling of those persons who cross the border and may be involved in the illicit trade of narcotics has been harmonised.

In 2013, preparations for White Paper of drug use reduction policy started and it was approved by the Government in 2014. The policy document is knowledge-based guideline for the annual planning of activities in the area of narcotics and is based on the EU Drugs Strategy for 2013–2020, drugs strategies of other countries, scientific literature, thorough consultations with experts in the field and service providers in Estonia. Contributions are made for launching and implementing a new early warning system for keeping track of new psychoactive substances. A significant amount of resources have been allocated in 2013 for the purpose of increasing the capability of the Central Criminal Police in processing crimes, including crimes related to

narcotics, and for the procurement of vehicles. Several supplementary trainings have been provided for police officers of the drug crimes unit. In 2013, 43 drugs related training events were held for the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB) officials on 14 different topics, 507 PBGB officials participated with total of 4905 academic hours. Until now, no financial support has been applied from EU or other funds in the area of narcotics-related crime.

In the beginning of 2014 an independent economic crimes bureau and analysis unit was established within the Central Criminal Police. The aim of the economic crimes bureau is intensive fight against serious economic crime (offences related to companies, bankruptcy, money laundering, fraud). In 2012 about 1,4 mln euros were allocated for performance-related pay, surveillance activities and for recruiting of new officials in order to fight serious and hidden organised crime. In 2013 almost 700 000 euros were allocated for the same purpose in order to develop databases.

At the beginning of 2013, the Criminal Police had 17 officers handling digital evidence. Considering the data volumes, the existing resources cannot ensure sufficient capability for the analysis and management of digital evidence and that will have a negative impact on uncovering and solving crimes. Crime has increasingly moved to the Internet and the number of data media containing digital evidence has doubled in Estonia in the past three years, with the volumes of data to be analysed growing every year. No additional funding has been found at the national level and no resources have been received from EU funds.

Practically all of the public services provided by the PBGB can only be rendered upon the availability of means of transport. As at 1 January 2013, the average age of the vehicles of the PBGB is 10 years and a large number of vehicles are therefore depreciated and need to be replaced.

There is a need to replace the majority of e-police equipment and to create a modern and secure technical platform (software solutions for mobile use), in order to ensure a more operative management of the field work of the entire PBGB as well as more rapid response capability and prevention of various incidents.

Crimes related to human trafficking are increased in particular at the expense of exploitation of minors (in 2013 the number of incidents was 18). In the previous years human trafficking crimes have been generally related to violence against prostitutes. In 2013 cases of forced crimes have been emerged where criminals have forced the victims to commit crimes (stealing, drug trafficking) by using violence. One of the problems is also lack of awareness raising campaigns in the area of human trafficking. So far, campaigns have been financed from the Nordic-Baltic Cooperation Programme at the beginning of the 2000s and from the Norwegian support programme for 2009-2014 "Domestic and Gender-based Violence".

The development of the areas described above is based on the following national strategies: MGSP; DPGA; the Baltic Sea Strategy; the Programme to Reduce Drug Use for 2013–2016; Guidelines for Development of Criminal Policy until 2018; the Action Plan of the Government of the Republic for 2011–2015 "Secure Estonia"; the Development Plan for Reducing Violence for years 2010–2014.

According to an analysis of the current situation, the most problematic area among the services provided by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre (EODC) is CBRN due to deficient tools and lacking response capability. The personnel protection equipment and technology used in the CBRN and explosive ordnance disposal area are constantly developing, but keeping up to date with technological developments requires large-scale investments which cannot be covered from the national budget. The needs for the development of the demining complex,

equipment and the explosive ordnance disposal information system DEMIS, for which resources are applied from the ISF, are outlined under the priority activities listed in DPGA 2014–2017.

The budget of the EODC was 1 596 324 euros in 2011, 2 127 308 euros in 2012 and 2 050 890 euros in 2013. In 2011, there were no funds for investments, in 2012 201 918 euros and in 2013 78 000 euros were allocated. A large part of the equipment currently in use has been received as aid from the United States (since 1998, the US has supported with equipment in the extent of 4 743 815 US dollars). No support has been received under the General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties.

Planning activities in the explosive ordnance disposal area are based on the strategic guidelines of the area, including DPGA and "Bases of Estonia's Security Policy", annual action plans and other area-specific documents and principles, implemented by four regional bomb groups and the planning and chemistry unit.

In 2013, EODC responded 1479 calls, there were 3569 explosives and 3 explosive devices identified, bomb technical inspections were conducted on 71 occasions and 29 CBRN calls were responded. In the framework of the mission to assess counter-terrorism activities in Estonia in 2009, foreign experts considered the accessibility of World War II explosive substances as one of the main internal security problems in Estonia. It is estimated that the ammunition elimination service makes up at least 50% of the total volume of services of the EODC (the number of explosives found is not decreasing). The workload is expected to increase considerably in connection with Estonia's EU presidency in 2018, as some of the meetings will be held in the country of presidency, which means a potentially higher-risk period due to the profile of the persons visiting Estonia and the importance of the events held here.

#### 3. PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

Specific objective	1 - Support a common visa policy			
DPGA of the MoI 2014–2017 adopted on the basis of MGSP establishes the main goal of the area: ensuring higher				
security of people and property, as well as constitutional order, domestic peace and stability in Estonia. For the				
purpose of achievement of this goal DPGA lists important activities including, among other, the service of issuing				
visas at the border (Aliens Act § 83: The Police and Border Guard Board shall make a decision on the issue of or				
refusal to issue a visa to an alien at a border checkpoint in exceptional cases.). Ensuring the service of approval of				
issuing visas and subsequent development of VIS are also emphasised as planned activities in DPGA. The latter				
activities are also related to the Policy Dialogue held between the European Commission and Estonia aimed at				
planning the internal security funds for the period 2014–2020, in the course of which complete implementation of				
VIS and development of respective national information systems were set as the expected result and financial				
priority.				

The goals set in the Development Plan of the MFA 2013–2016 include readiness for annual processing of 151 000 visa applications. Effective processing of visa applications and provision of customer-friendly services to visa applicants were set in the course of the Policy Dialogue as the expected result in the area of implementing the common visa policy. In the course of the political dialogue the parties agreed that updating of the equipment (computers) and training of consular officials shall be the financial priority. Costs are related to Schengen visa processing, not consular services in general.

National objective	1 - National capacity

The software of fingerprint scanners used by the MFA and PBGB in visa procedure does not work on the Windows 7 operating system. Purchasing fingerprint scanners of VIS will ensure forwarding of high-quality fingerprint files to the central system of VIS, so that visa procedure could be performed according to the requirements of the Visa Code and the Aliens Act (including taking of fingerprints) also after replacement of the Windows XP operating system with Windows 7 on working computers.

The updating of computers of working places of the consular officials dealing with Schengen visa procedure is necessary due to depreciation of the computers and in order to ensure effective and operative processing of visas.

Apart from issuing visas at the border, the PBGB has also other responsibilities in the process of issuing visas. The consular officers are required to coordinate the issuing of a visa with the PBGB in order to identify whether there are any grounds for the refusal of issuing visa (illegal migration, possible connection to cross-border crime, threat to public order). Currently the coordination of issuing Schengen visas takes place using different systems in order to identify the possible grounds for refusing the issuing of visa. Currently used systems will be unified and as a result approval of visa issuing will be done using one system used by one unit of the PBGB.

In the national visa register the developments arising from the implementation of the Visa Code and VIS need to be completed.

#### **Funding priorities**

The following main actions will be supported by the state budget and EU funds:

- 1. Purchasing fingerprint scanners of VIS used in visa procedure.
- 2. Updating of computers used for consular activities by Estonian Representations dealing with Schengen visa procedure.
- 3. Developments of information systems (approval of visas).
- 4. Subsequent developments of the Visa Code and VIS in the visa register.

# **Results**

• Unified Schengen visa approval system

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective 2 - Union acquis
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Officials of Estonian Representations, the MFA, the MoI and the PBGB need training supporting the implementation of the common visa policy and correct and uniform application of the Schengen acquis. One of the aims of the joint training for the authorities is better management of information and communication between the authorities and internally. There is a need for knowledge concerning the areas of the authorities that are directly and indirectly related to each other. Joint training fosters information exchange between authorities and improves cooperation, helping to ensure uniform application of the Schengen acquis and implementation of the common visa policy in a better way.

Knowledge of officials participating in the training will increase. A collection of best practices of consular cooperation will be prepared with the topics covered during the trainings and to be used by a larger target group during a longer period. In the collection possible weaknesses of implementing the EU common visa policy and uniform application of the Schengen acquis by the Estonian authorities will be outlined and solutions are proposed.

A new form of cooperation between national authorities will be formed, which will presumably help to apply best practices in work of the officials.

# **Funding priority**

The following action will be funded by state and EU funds.

Joint trainings of the consular officials, the officials of PBGB and the MoI, which support implementation of the common visa policy of the EU and uniform application of the Schengen acquis among authorities participating in the training.

Examples of priority topics:

- Implementation of the common visa policy and correct and uniform application of the Schengen acquis in order to ensure equal treatment (involve also authorities of Eastern Partnership countries);
- Identification of falsified documents;
- Evaluation of the risk of illegal immigration;
- Smuggling and illegal migration;
- Interviewing and profiling.

The action is financially divided between priorities related to acquis concerning visas and acquis concerning external borders, as the action contributes to both goals. The apportionment will be made on the participant's main tasks (e.g. visas or border).

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	3 - Consular cooperation
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Actions with the given priority are not planned to be financed through ISF programme.

As the network of Estonian foreign representations is small, widening and better management of the network of visa representation agreements is a priority; also we try to harmonize these agreements where it's possible. No extra resources have been planned for this purpose under the national budget; expenses are covered from funds intended for everyday activity of the MFA.

Specific action	1 - Consular cooperation
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1. Estonia is a partner in the specific action "Consular Cooperation Mechanism" for which Belgium will act as a lead Member State. The project aims to set up a Consular Cooperation Mechanism on Schengen Visa Processing (CCM) in commonly agreed third countries. This mechanism relies on three operational pillars:

- Joint assessment of risks and trends between MS at capitals and field level in visa abuse, document fraud and irregular migration;
- Deployment of joint document verification officers or document verification services, to investigate the authenticity and reliability of information submitted in the ambit of Schengen-visa applications;

Joint training of MS and consular staff in assessing supporting documents emitted by third countries, in analyzing trends in Schengen-visa abuse, detecting false and forged identity and travel documents; and where relevant, joint training of third countries' authorities to reinforce the reliability of Schengen-visa source documents.

As a project partner, Estonia will participate in joint actions in commonly agreed third countries and be a cobeneficiary of the grant. The apportionment between the partners will be made at the start of the project.

2. Schengen House Ulanbaatar, Mongolia, leading state Czech Republic: Estonia will be represented in the visa issuance in Ulaanbaatar by Czech Republic. Partner states will participate only on non-cost basis.

3. The main objective of the action "Schengen Representation House in Kigali (Rwanda) and Bujumbura (Burundi)" (led by Belgium) is to contribute to better services for visa applicants as well as to generate economies of scale on processing of applications and issuing of visas in countries where Belgium represents a majority of MS. Bilateral taskforces with project partners could also be set up to expand, standardize and follow up on existing representation agreements. The partner organisations are co-beneficiary of the grant on non-cost basis.

The action partners will:

- Actively participate in the bilateral taskforces;
- Designate staff to train visa agents and local staff.

Specific objective2 - BordersMGSP establishes the following goals: the state is able to reliably identify persons staying in Estonia; possibilities<br/>for illegal entry to Estonia and over-stay in Estonia are reduced. To achieve these goals the plan is to provide<br/>unification of databases related to the identification of persons and identification documents and procedures related<br/>to statuses of persons. This will increase effectiveness of activities aimed at prevention, combating and<br/>identification of illegal immigration; increase the effectiveness of information exchange received from marine areas<br/>between competent authorities; building of land section border, including river and lake border, of the external<br/>border; enhance guarding of land border of the external border with the help of technical surveillance systems and<br/>increase the use of modern technology during border control.

DPGA of the MoI 2014–2017 adopted on the basis of MGSP establishes the main goal of the area: ensuring higher security of people and property, as well as constitutional order, domestic peace and stability in Estonia. For the purpose of achievement of this goal DPGA lists important activities including, among other, prevention, combating and identification of illegal crossing of the state border. This is ensured by patrolling and inspecting the areas between border crossing points, using service dogs, technical (electronic) means and transport means (including aircrafts). EUROSUR is emphasized as the most important development in the coming years. In addition, DPGA includes plans to purchase night vision and border control equipment, additional equipment for aircraft and fully automated border control systems (ABC (Automated Border Control) gates), which can also be used for the future Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) component of the Smart Borders initiative. According to DPGA, capability to ensure surveillance of the external border must be supported by the replacement of depreciated land vehicles and watercrafts. In order to ensure sustainability of the operative radio communication network, which makes border control more effective, the development plan provides for the purchase of an additional central station and the infrastructure supporting it.

In the DPGA, ensuring the service of surveillance of migration is stated as important activity in the area of migration surveillance, including capability to perform during the years 2014–2017 at least 800 control actions annually for controlling the fulfilment of basis for stay of aliens in Estonia. The main share of the persons staying in the state illegally consists of persons abusing their visas.

The goals and the planned actions described in the strategy and the actions financed from the fund are to a large extent included in the agreed minutes of the Policy Dialogue held between the European Commission and Estonia.

National objective 1 - EUROSUR
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In order to increase effectiveness of guarding the external land border of the EU, it is necessary to purchase technical means: purchasing cameras and developing a mobile i.e. portable system based on modern technology, which includes data exchange software, central management system and modern sensors connected into a single network.

Manned patrolling will be step by step substituted with technical guarding, which will lead to the need for increased response capability. The goal is to adopt the use of new technical means (equipment to detect) and to install, according to the specific conditions of a respective border section, the technical guarding and surveillance equipment that forms an integrated surveillance system.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be purchased as additional means for the border guard and will be used as any other patrolling equipment. Initial plan is to purchase multi-rotors running on batteries and equipped with day and thermal cameras. Purpose is to procure end products and most important requirements are related to flight time, optics and simplicity of operating (every border guard should be able to use the device after training). UAVs do not require a permit by the Estonian Civil Aviation Administration, if they are used outside take-off and landing zones.

In order to ensure 24 hours a day patrolling capability (incl. during the dark), it is necessary to replace the existing depreciated night vision equipment.

The infrastructure in the current server room, supporting the ICT services of the governing area of the MoI, is outdated. In order to provide ICT services and ensure reliability and security of ICT systems, the establishment of data centre is necessary. Risk of failures in ICT services resulting from hardware will be decreased with architecture and hardware of the new server room in the data centre.

#### **Funding priorities**

The following main actions:

- 1. Night vision equipment.
- 2. Technical means for guarding the external land border.
- 3. Integration of the surveillance systems of the Eastern border.
- 4. Unmanned aerial vehicles. About 90% of financing within the framework of the ISF project (EU support and co-financing by the state); about 10% from the state budget (used also for activities that are not eligible under ISF).
- 5. Ensuring the reliability and security of ICT systems.

Areas which are eligible will be financed with ISF funds, dividing the financing between two financial instruments (incl. co-financing by the state). Any ineligible part will be financed outside the ISF project from the state budget (in case of mixed-use).

# <u>Results</u>

• Full compliance and EUROSUR preparedness

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	2 - Information exchange

In order to handle cross-border crime, it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of solving crimes committed by international mobile groups. Due to the transition to SIS II, it is necessary to perform system development according to recommendations of EU-LISA (the EU Agency for large-scale IT systems) and internal needs, which in total increases effective usage of the system.

Border guard units use hand terminals for maintaining communication. The connection in the forests of southeast Estonia is poor and patrols do not have connection with control centres or each other. Therefore, vehicles must be equipped with terminals that enable communication signal in case of failures in the operation of the operative radio communication network.

Modern radio stations must be purchased for sea guarding centres (in case of available funds also for border crossing points), centres and vessels must be equipped with databases for information and data exchange and with failure-proof working means. As a result radio and data connection will improve.

For improving operative radio communication, it is necessary to widen the working area of the network. Additional supporting stations and connections between them will be installed and connected to the common network; as a result it will be possible to carry out border control in locations where the network does not work.

# **Funding priorities**

The following main actions:

- 1. Activities related to the introduction of SIS II.
- 2. Ensuring connection of communication and data communication systems for border surveillance and control.
- 3. Radio and data connection systems.
- 4. Widening the operative radio communication network: 90% eligible for financing within the framework of the ISF project (incl. co-financing by the state), dividing the measures between two financial instruments, and 10% outside the ISF project from the state budget, as 90% of the operative radio communication network is used according to the ISF goals (mixed-use).

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	3 - Common Union standards
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The creation of the central system for certificates will allow to control, in addition to other personal data, correspondence of the fingerprints of the document user with the fingerprints entered in the document, and to ensure the authenticity of the document during the performance of border control. The system will ensure a significantly

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higher level of security and reliability compared to the present capability of identification of a person, practically eliminating possibility to use a false identity. The availability of the certificates' distribution system is a prerequisite for effective use of ABC gates.

In order to ensure the provision of faster border control service to the EU citizens, ABC gates will be installed in the border crossing points with high burden.

#### **Funding priorities**

The following main actions:

- 1. Distribution system for certificates (SPOC).
- 2. Fully automated border control systems.

#### Results

• Installation of ABC gates

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective4 - Union acquis	

Preparation of the officials must correspond to the conditions of the EU and the Schengen common visa area, and allow implementation of new border control measures. Professional personnel helps to ensure smooth crossing of the border, prevention of illegal border crossing, high level and further development of services.

Officials of Estonian Representations, the MFA, the MoI and the PBGB require training supporting the implementation of the common visa policy and correct and uniform application of the Schengen *acquis*. One of the aims of the joint training for the authorities is better management of information and communication between the authorities and internally. Joint training fosters information exchange and improves cooperation, helping to ensure uniform application of the Schengen acquis and implementation of the common visa policy in a better way.

Knowledge of the officials will increase and a best practice handbook of consular cooperation for Schengen visas will be prepared. A new form of cooperation between national authorities will help to apply best practices in the work of the officials.

#### **Funding priorities**

The following main actions:

- 1. Training of the PBGB experts.
- 2. Joint trainings of the consular officials, the officials of PBGB and the MoI, which support implementation of the common visa policy of the EU and uniform application of the Schengen *acquis* among authorities participating in the training.

Examples of main topics:

- Implementation of the common visa policy and correct and uniform application of the Schengen acquis in order to ensure equal treatment (involve also authorities of Eastern Partnership countries);
- Identification of falsified documents;
- Evaluation of the risk of illegal immigration;
- Smuggling and illegal migration;
- Interviewing and profiling.

The second action is financially divided into between priorities related to acquis concerning visas and acquis concerning external borders, as the action contributes to both goals. The apportionment will be made based on the participants' main tasks (e.g. border management).

Result

• 955 persons trained

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	5 - Future challenges

Actions with the given priority are not planned.

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The smart borders package is an important initiative in the area of Schengen enabling effectively combat illegal immigration and cross-border crime. The most important is the launch of EES and ETIAS.

Migration surveillance equipment requires updating. It is one of the compensatory measures to contribute to the objective of promoting the development, implementation and enforcement of policies with a view to ensuring the absence of any controls on persons, when crossing the internal borders. The absence of controls on persons when crossing the internal borders, the risk of possible illegal migration is higher. Surveillance equipment is also necessary flanking measure on document security and identity management within the territory of the state which is performed based on a risk assessment.

In addition, there is no possibility to send inquiries to VIS on the basis of fingerprints and/or alpha-numeric data to verify the basis for stay of an alien in Estonia and identify persons. For this purpose the function for sending inquiries will be created into national information system.

The quality and speed of border control needs to be increased with modern equipment. To ensure connectivity with new information systems, it is necessary to update computer equipment in vehicles.

Depreciated land vehicles and watercrafts (including equipment if required) need to be replaced in order to enhance technical readiness, incl. in rough terrain and under difficult conditions. In order to ensure faster response to border incidents and 24 hours a day readiness for patrolling, the equipment of helicopters will be updated.

#### **Funding priorities**

- 1. Development and implementation of the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). Funding for this priority will be provided as stipulated under Section 7.
- Support to the quick and effective upgrading of the national components of the SIS, in line with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861. Funding for this priority will be provided as stipulated under Section 7
- 3. Development and implementation of the EU EES. Funding for this priority will be provided as stipulated under Section 7
- 4. Equipment for migration surveillance and updating of border control equipment
- 5. Creation of possibilities to make VIS enquiries within procedures of migration surveillance
- 6. IT developments
- 7. Replacement of patrol vehicles
- 8. Special transport for patrolling areas with rough terrain and under difficult weather conditions
- 9. Watercrafts
- 10. Updating of helicopter equipment
- 11. Secondment of ILOs

#### Results

- The percentage of solved illegal border crossings at least on the level of 90%
- Satisfaction of the persons crossing the border with border check 86%
- Increase the quality of border controls

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

Specific action

2 - FRONTEX equipment

**1 coastal patrol boat CPB-RHIB** (mono hull Rigid Inflatable Boat, incl. neccessay equipment) will be purchased and put at the disposal of the EBCGA.

# Technical description:

Length 9,5–12,00 m; beam 3–3,5 m; draft (hull) max 0,8 m; draft (outboard engines) max 1,0 m. Speed max > 55 knots – on the light weather conditions (wind less than 4m/s), with 50% fuel and at least 6 crewmembers (6x110kg) on board. Speed 45 knots – on the light weather conditions (wind less than 4m/s), with 100% fuel and at least 17 crewmembers (17x110kg) on board. Economical cruising speed – builder and engine manufacturer calculation but no less than 250 nm (nautical miles).

CPB shall have:

- Hull with 4 lifting eyes and the boat floatability in case of damage of one compartment, must be complayed
- Inflated collar
- Kiel protected by a full-lenght stainless steel inserts
- 2-person console with frame and front window
- Easily removable wheelhouse to cover at least 4 (nearest to console) seats in patrolling situation
- 3 four-stroke outboard engines with fast speed propellers to ensure reaching demanded max speed 55+ knots like shown in characteristics
- High capacity 12V generators and multi battery isolators/relays to charge batteries
- Hydraulic steering
- At least 2 stainless steel fuel tanks below the deck
- Electric system that is powerful enough to ensure the use of all electric consumers simultaneously
- Non-slip coated deck

#### On-board equipment:

- Lighting navigation lights, search light with fixed mount and manual remote control, LED deck lights, work lights, all lights out switch, storage compartment lights and with readiness for IR light in the mast
- Navigation equipment, IR camera, OLYMPIA-TRIUMPH boarding system for 15m operation
- Rails, cleats, frames

#### Additional necessary equipment:

- **Trailer** (usually comes with the boat), meant for transporting CPB-RHIB with following gear: support wheel, winch with automatic lock, stand on proof mudguards, LED lights, waterproof wheel hubs, hot-dip galvanized frame.
- **Specialized vehicle** for boat transportation in EE and to the EBCGA joint operations or rapid interventions at EU external borders (N2).

Specific objective	3 - Operating support

Specific objective	5 - Preventing and combating crime

"Bases of Estonia's Security Policy" establishes the goal of preventing and combating terrorism in all of its forms, preventing the influence of international organised crime, combating acquisition of illegal income and its legalisation. The emphasis is put on the importance of combating cyber-crime as a part of combating terrorism and international organised crime and ensuring the functioning of information and communication systems and financial security.

According to "Guidelines for Development of the Criminal Policy Until 2018" the biggest threat to society is posed by organised crime, including economic, corruption, cyber and human trafficking crimes, due to which increased attention must be paid to the prevention of and response to the given crimes.

MGSP establishes the following goals: increasing effectiveness of prevention of and combating terrorist acts; enhancing prevention of and combating intelligence and sabotage activities against Estonia; increasing the effectiveness of confiscating criminally acquired income.

DPGA of the MoI 2014–2017 establishes the main goal of the area: ensuring higher security of people and property, constitutional order, domestic peace and stability. DPGA lists activities that include, among other, resolving violations of order through replacement of the depreciated e-police equipment, increasing capability to manage digital evidence, to combat serious drug-related crime, to detect criminal income and increasing capability of pursuit activities. The achievement of the general goal set by DPGA is supported by the development of ICT services and ensuring sustainability of the operative radio communication network.

The Development Plan for the Governing Area of the Ministry of Finance 2014–2017 provides for adoption of new solutions for customs control (incl. automatic number plate recognition system – ANTS) and purchasing X-ray equipment.

The goals stated in the strategies and measures financed by ISF are related to priorities set during the Policy Dialogue. The new MGSP and DPGA after 2017 will be in line with the ISF national programme.

Financing priorities of combating drug trafficking were agreed upon: supporting actions related to the purchase of narcotic substance identification technology and equipment, as well as training focusing on the given area. It was decided to finance from ISF: measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of financial investigations in the area of serious and organised crime; updating of the present information technologies and infrastructure; investments in safe communication channels in order to ensure cyber security. Financing related to the European training scheme in the area of law enforcement (LETS) is financed with the Estonian state budget.

Increasing capability of pursuit activities, capability of the drug police and the effectiveness of processing digital evidence ensure the increase of knowledge and capability of about 20% of all the Central Criminal Police officials.

National objective	1 - C - prevention and combating

In order to improve capability of police officials it is important to replace the depreciated e-police equipment and finance related ICT development.

It is necessary to increase procedural capacity concerning serious hidden and organised crime: transferring the mobile positioning system to a new platform, replacing pursuit vehicles, increasing effectiveness of processing digital evidence (including ca 18 officials trained). Mainly units handling serious and hidden crimes, including crimes against children, need digital evidence. The aforementioned activities contribute also to more effective financial investigation in the context of FATF definition.

Evidential narcometer will be developed as a result of scientific research, which will be able to provide evidencebased assessment of consuming drugs in larger group of narcotic substances and help at the location of incidents. Development will be done by university researchers and potential solution could be capillary electrophoresis technology. Also purchasing modern narcotics analysers is planned.

For the purpose of discovering illicit goods purchasing equipment and installing ANTS into customs vehicle is required.

In order to identify and solve crimes, it is important to increase capability of searching material evidence in the Internet and on information carriers, and to invest in safety of officials by purchasing equipment which can be used at the scene of crime or in emergency situations. It is necessary to increase competence of the officials making decisions about issuing visas based on risk analysis and improve language skills.

Data centre needs to be established in order to provide ICT services and ensure reliability and security of ICT systems.

#### **Funding priorities**

- 1. Purchasing of e-police equipment and financing of related ICT development.
- 2. Increasing the effectiveness of processing digital evidence.
- 3. Purchase of pursuit vehicles.
- 4. Development of the evidential narcometer.
- 5. Purchase of narcotics analysers.
- 6. Identifying the location of terminal equipment and increasing effectiveness of pursuit capacity.
- 7. Purchase of portable X-ray equipment.
- 8. Purchase of ANTS for the customs vehicles.
- 9. Software for prevention of security threats and identification of crimes.
- 10. Investments in security of officials.
- 11. Prevention of terrorism.
- 12. Improving Arabic language skills.
- 13. Ensuring the reliability and security of ICT systems.

Areas which are eligible will be financed within the ISF dividing the financing between the two financial instruments (incl. co-financing by the state). Any ineligible part will be financed outside the ISF project from the state budget (Action 13).

#### **Results**

• Enhanced prevention of terrorism

• Update and modernise police tools and services

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	2 - C - exchange of information

Law enforcement communications and police communications are essential assets to the safety and security initiatives in any community. Advancing police communications allow law enforcement to be more mobile and more rapidly respond to incidents.

In order to improve the availability of operative radio communication it is necessary to widen the working area of the operative radio communication network. For this purpose additional supporting stations and connections between them will be installed and connected to the present common network. As a result, it will be possible to carry out police duties and ensure public order in locations where at present network does not work.

### **Funding priorities**

1) Widening the operative radio communication network: about 90% eligible for financing within the framework of the ISF project (incl. EU support and co-financing by the state), dividing the measures between two financial instruments, and 10% outside the ISF project from the state budget, as to the extent of 90% the network is used by the governing area of the MoI according to the goals of ISF, but to the extent of 10% by the governing areas of other ministries (mixed-use).

2) Setting up of new and development of existing Passenger Information Units (PIU) at national level to develop and implement a Passenger Name Record IT System, as referred to in paragraph 1 (e) of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 513/2014.

3) Developing the necessary IT solutions to increase the exchange of information with other EU Member States and the interoperability with the IT systems and databases developed by the EU or other EU Member States.

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

	National objective	3 - C - training
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In order to increase capability for pursuit activities it is necessary to modernise activities related to the management of persons involved in secret cooperation, including the training system. Introduction of best European practices will lead to the increase in quality of information obtained from persons involved in secret cooperation and creation of better possibilities for finding evidence and sources in the course of criminal procedure, as well as better identification of criminal income. Also the danger of corruption reduces among pursuit officials, awareness of activities in the given area and security of officials increases. The activity contributes also to more effective financial investigation in the context of FATF definition. It is important to reduce the offer of drugs that pose the most danger to people. In order to achieve this goal, the drug police officers must be capable of identifying drug labs and synthetic drugs, first and foremost fentanyl, but also other drugs such as cocaine, cannabis and heroin. The achievement of the goal will be assisted by introducing activity model of drug police for increasing capability of police officers and trainings to be carried out for the implementation of it.

#### **Funding priorities**

- 1. Increasing capability of pursuit activities through training.
- 2. Increasing capability of the drug police through development and implementation of a modern training programme.

#### <u>Results</u>

• ca 165 officials trained

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	4 - C - victim support

Awareness campaign organised as a result of wider cross-area cooperation is the best method to inform the population of different human trafficking forms existing in Estonia, possibilities for receiving help and roles of the parties acting in the given area in managing cases of human trafficking. The campaign will result in increasing people's awareness of human trafficking as a crime, its different forms, and possibilities for receiving help. In addition, there will be an increase in the number of people turning to aid organisations and state authorities in order to find a solution to a possible case of human trafficking.

#### **Funding priorities**

- 1. awareness campaign with three focus topics: exploitation of labour, increasing awareness among adult population about employment; mediation and forced labour, and directing victims to victim support services; sexual exploitation from the position of demand; minors as victims of forced begging;
- 2. pre- and post-campaign research aimed at assessment of awareness level of the population;
- 3. thematic analysis seminar for specialists in the given area following the completion of campaigns.

#### **Results**

- Higher awareness of people trafficking
- More victims identified

• More persons seeking assistance

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	5 - C - threat and risk assessment

Actions with the given priority are not planned to be financed through the ISF programme.

In 2014, an independent economic crimes bureau and analysis unit was established within the Central Criminal Police with national budget. The aim of the economic crimes bureau is intensive fight against serious economic crime (offences related to companies, bankruptcy, money laundering, frauds etc.). Establishment of the bureau brought along clear problem and field-based approach regarding economic crime and increased the capability of Central Criminal Police to develop comprehensive threat and risk assessments in relation to crimes which are most damaging to economic environment.

Combating the illicit trade in narcotics is a priority. Additional national resources have been allocated to the Central Criminal Police in order to focus heavily on serious crimes and organised groups related to narcotics. Establishment of the specialised narcotics unit that was launched at the beginning of 2013 increased the capability of Central Criminal Police to develop comprehensive threat and risk assessments in relation to drug-related crimes.

 Specific objective
 6 - Risks and crisis

"Bases of Estonia's Security Policy" adopted by the resolution of the Parliament establishes the goal of ensuring safe environment, security of residents, prevention and management of dangers to security, as well as reliability of vital services. In order to achieve these goals it is necessary, among other, to ensure protection of the population in emergencies, as well as prevention of threat of terrorism that may involve CBRN and explosive substances. The emphasis is put on the significance of sustainability of fight against cyber-crime, especially protecting the functioning of information and communication systems of vital services. The system of early warning on radiation threat holds an important role in development of radiation protection and radiation security.

MGSP establishes common principles and long-term goals of the security policy, achievement of which must be assisted by public, non-profit and private sector.

DPGA of the MoI 2014–2017 adopted on the basis of MGSP establishes the main goal of the area: ensuring higher security of people and property. For the purpose of achievement of this goal DPGA lists important activities including, among other, service for elimination of bomb and explosion threat (incl. development of the rescue information system application DEMIS) and the service for elimination of CBRN threat. The necessity for a demining complex, as well as a bomb container, a radio wave jammer, small bomb disposal robots and protective equipment for deminers is emphasised. Achievement of these goals will be assisted by the development of ICT services.

The goals stated in the strategic documents and the actions financed by ISF are also related to the goals set in the course of the Policy Dialogue held between the European Commission and Estonia. Also the new MGSP and DPGA after 2017 will be in line with the ISF national programme.

Increasing the capability of CBRN was considered as an important topic from the positions of response and investigation capability. The following expected results and financing priorities were agreed upon: increasing readiness for the management of CBRN and ensuring capability for performance of neutralisation of CBRN materials, mines and other explosive materials; purchase of protective equipment and development of information systems; construction of the CBRN and demining complex; increasing processing capability of the relevant authorities. Contributing to cyber security and system of early warning on radiation threat was also indicated separately. As the ISF funds are limited, cyber security activities are mostly financed through state budget. In the PBGB the number of officials engaged with cyber-crimes and the capacity of the officials to handle digital data carriers (including evidence) will be increased. In addition, the technological capacity will be raised through using modern hard- and software; also storage conditions of the digital evidence will be improved.

National objective	1 - R - prevention and combating
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Estonia lacks equipment for identification of chemical and biological substances, equipment for responding to CBRN emergency incidents, and the CBRN bus is not completely equipped. There is no access to the database of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it is partly not possible to analyse chemical and biological weapons that could pose danger to security.

In order to ensure safety of deminers during neutralisation of dangerous explosives, it is necessary to purchase bomb suits. In order to neutralise or remove explosive devices from locations that are narrow or hard to access, and to organise observation of the incident location in case of armed crime or other dangerous situations, it is necessary to purchase small bomb disposal robots.

The need for more effective elimination of explosion threat will be addressed by purchasing reactive radio wave jammer in case of available resources. For safe transport of explosives there is a need for a closed bomb container, which will be purchased in case of available resources.

#### **Funding priorities**

The following main actions (areas of activities) will be considered as main financial priorities (depending on the need and availability of resources also other eligible activities could be considered):

- 1. Increasing the capability of CBRN.
- 2. Purchasing heavy bomb suits.
- 3. Purchasing small bomb disposal robots.

# **Results**

- Increasing the capability of CBRN
- Ensuring public safety

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	2 - R - exchange of information
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Action "Development of the DEMIS application of the rescue information system" which is placed under national objective "R - Threat and risk assessment" contributes also to the objective outlined in the Article 3 (3) (b) of the ISF-Police regulation.

Implementation of measures related to prevention and combating of terrorism is financed with national budget resources: preventing and combating financing and supporting of terrorism; necessary information gathering and processing it in order to prevent terrorism.

National objective3 - R - training

In order to increase the capability of CBRN it is necessary to raise the qualification of officials through participation in cooperation projects and conducting trainings. Potential trainings, for example, in the European CBRNE Centre of the Umeå University in Sweden or practical seminars in UK and USA will be carried out. Possible participation at symposiums or conferences and in the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence programme are considered.

#### **Funding priority**

• Training officials for CBRN tasks

#### <u>Result</u>

- 44 officials
- Increasing the capability of CBRN

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	4 - R - victim support
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Actions with the given priority are not planned to be financed through the ISF programme.

Measures in the area of preventing and combating terrorism are financed from national budget. The details on the measures are not public information.

Most of the buildings of the Estonian EODC of the Rescue Board are in barely satisfactory or poor condition. None of the buildings used were built specifically taking into account demining or CBRN area. The response squad of the Northern Estonian bomb group is located in the former garage complex in the city centre of Tallinn.

There are no destruction places established by the state, and destruction of explosives takes place according to agreements with land owners. Construction of a CBRN and a demining complex or renovating suitable existing facility outside the city centre is necessary in order to organise safe performance of activities of the demining area in one complex at least in Northern Estonia, and to move the centre away from city centre of Tallinn. The complex would include storage and maintenance facilities for explosives and CBRN, destruction place, lab for research of explosive devices and CBRN. The storage facility of the complex would be used besides the Rescue Board also by other authorities.

The complex will ensure safe handling and uniform storage of special materials, as well as operative readiness for response. This will increase capabilities in the area of demining and CBRN, which will also be necessary during the Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

#### **Funding priority:**

Constructing of the CBRN and demining complex or renovating suitable existing facility outside the city centre for the same purpose.

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective	6 - R - early warning and crisis
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The software, equipment and communication systems of the system of early warning on radiation threat must be modernised. Functioning of the system without failures helps to ensure early identification and warning of the population in case of dangerous cross-border radiation accidents.

In order to ensure identification and analysis of cyber-attacks aimed at critical information systems of vital service providers, it is necessary to develop terms of reference and a prototype of the respective surveillance system. This would provide the basis for acquisition of attack identification means for providers of vital services, establish the maintenance of the system and analyse risks. Development of the centralised surveillance system and analysis capability will help to prevent and more effectively repel cyber-attacks.

The infrastructure in the current server room, supporting the ICT services of the governing area of the MoI, is outdated. In order to provide ICT services and ensure reliability and security of ICT systems, the establishment of data centre is necessary. Risk of failures in ICT services resulting from hardware will be decreased with architecture and hardware of the new server room in the data centre.

#### **Funding priorities**

- 1. Modernisation of the software, equipment and communication systems of the system of early warning on radiation threat.
- 2. Security surveillance of the networks of the vital service providers depending on information systems, incl. industrial automated control systems, aimed at identification of cyber-attacks and malware.
- 3. Ensuring the reliability and security of ICT systems.

Action 3 involves all the areas in the governing area of the MoI. Areas which are eligible will be financed within the framework of ISF dividing the financing between two financial instruments (incl. co-financing by the state). Ineligible part will be financed outside the ISF project from the state budget. The apportionment will be made during the programme and adjusted for actual use.

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

National objective7 - R - threat and risk a	ssessment
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One of the significant factors hindering the performance of EODC is the limited functionality of the rescue information system application DEMIS. The DEMIS software is used for collection, storage, search and statistical analysis of the data obtained during a demining event and it includes the data concerning explosives-related calls in Estonia of the past 20 years. In case of failure of the information system the data that has been collected may disappear. The software is built on a platform that does not correspond to the requirements of the three level baseline security system of ICT systems (ISKE). Major problems are caused by ageing of the map bases and absence of a possibility to change parameters of search fields, which in turn have a direct influence on analysis capability of the EODC. Widening the possibilities to make enquiries and higher quality of information collection reduces risks of possible errors during demining work, increases effectiveness, and allows more effective planning of training and protecting information related to criminal procedure.

In order to increase capability of the Rescue Board and the ERC to assess security risks and perform crisis management, it is necessary to develop and implement a technical solution supporting performance of tactical and strategic management: database information system.

#### **Funding priorities**

- 1. Development of the DEMIS application of the rescue information system.
- 2. Development of the database information system for the Rescue Board and the Emergency Response Centre.

Depending on the needs and available resources other actions may be considered.

# **INDICATIVE TIMETABLE**

Specific objective	NO/SA	Main action	Name of action	Start of planning phase	Start of implementation phase	Start of closing phase
SO1 - Support a common visa	NO1 - National capacity	1	Purchasing fingerprint scanners of VIS used in visa procedure.	2014	2015	2016
policy SO1 - Support a common visa policy	NO1 - National capacity	2	Updating of computers used for Schengen consular activities by Estonian Representations.	2014	2015	2016
SO1 - Support a common visa policy	NO1 - National capacity	3	Developments of information systems (approval of visas).	2014	2016	2017
SO1 - Support a common visa policy	NO2 - Union acquis	1	Joint trainings of the consular officials, the officials of PBGB and the MoI.	2014	2015	2017
SO2 - Borders	NO1 - EUROSUR	1	Night vision equipment.	2015	2015	2018
SO2 - Borders	NO1 - EUROSUR	2	Technical means for guarding the external land border.	2013	2013	2018
SO2 - Borders	NO1 - EUROSUR	3	Integration of the surveillance systems of the Eastern border.	2016	2018	2022
SO2 - Borders	NO2 - Information exchange	1	Activities related to the introduction of SIS II.	2014	2016	2018
SO2 - Borders	NO2 - Information exchange	2	Widening the operative radio communication network.	2015	2016	2018
SO2 - Borders	NO2 - Information exchange	3	Radio and data connection systems.	2014	2015	2016
SO2 - Borders	NO3 - Common Union standards	1	Distribution system for certificates (SPOC).	2016	2016	2019
SO2 - Borders	NO3 - Common Union standards	2	Fully automated border control systems.	2016	2018	2022
SO2 - Borders	NO4 - Union acquis	1	Training of the PBGB experts.	2014	2015	2021
SO2 - Borders	NO4 - Union acquis	2	Joint trainings of the consular officials, the officials of PBGB and the MoI.	2014	2015	2021
SO2 - Borders	NO6 - National capacity	1	Equipment for migration surveillance and updating of border control equipment.	2015	2015	2020
SO2 - Borders	NO6 - National capacity	2	EES, SIS and ETIAS system development.	2018	2019	2022
SO2 - Borders	NO6 - National capacity	3	Replacement of patrol vehicles.	2014	2015	2016
SO2 - Borders	SA2 - FRONTEX equipment	1	Purchase of a CPB-RHIB	2018	2018	2020
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO1 - C - prevention and combating	1	Purchasing of e-police equipment and financing of related ICT development.	2014	2015	2019
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO1 - C - prevention and combating	2	Increasing the effectiveness of processing digital evidence.	2014	2015	2017
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO1 - C - prevention and combating	3	Purchase of pursuit vehicles.	2014	2015	2020
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO2 - C - exchange of information	1	Widening the operative radio communication network.	2016	2016	2018
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO2 - C - exchange of information	2	Development and implementation of the PNR system.	2016	2017	2021
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO3 - C - training	1	Increasing capability of pursuit activities through training.	2014	2015	2018
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO3 - C - training	2	Increasing capability of the drug police through modern training programme.	2014	2015	2017
SO5 - Preventing and combating crime	NO4 - C - victim support	1	Awareness activities aimed at prevention of human trafficking and support of victims.	2014	2015	2017
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO1 - R - prevention and combating	1	Increasing the capability of CBRN.	2014	2015	2021
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO1 - R - prevention and combating	2	Purchasing heavy bomb suits.	2014	2015	2016





Specific objective	NO/SA	Main action	Name of action	Start of planning phase	Start of implementation phase	Start of closing phase
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO1 - R - prevention and combating	3	Purchasing small bomb disposal robots.	2015	2015	2016
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO3 - R - training	1	Increasing the capability of CBRN.	2016	2016	2020
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO5 - R - infrastructure	1	Construction of the CBRN and demining complex or renovating suitable existing facility.	2016	2017	2020
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO6 - R - early warning and crisis	1	Modernisation of the system of early warning on radiation threat.	2019	2019	2020
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO6 - R - early warning and crisis	2	Security surveillance of the networks of the vital service providers.	2017	2017	2019
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO6 - R - early warning and crisis	3	Ensuring reliability of the ICT systems.	2015	2015	2017
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO7 - R - threat and risk assessment	1	Development of the DEMIS application of the rescue information system.	2015	2015	2018
SO6 - Risks and crisis	NO7 - R - threat and risk assessment	2	Development of the database information system for the Rescue Board and the ERC.	2015	2015	2019

### **5. COMMON INDICATORS AND PROGRAMME SPECIFIC INDICATORS:**

Specific objective	1 - Support a common visa policy					
Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline value	Target value	Source data	of	
C1 - Number of consular cooperation activities developed with the help of the Fund	Number	0.00	0.00	Projects		
C2.1 - Number of staff trained in common visa policy related aspects with the help of the	Number	0.00	255.00	Projects		
Fund				-		
C2.2 - Number of training courses (hours completed)	Number	0.00	500.00	Projects		
C3 - Number of specialised posts in third countries supported by the Fund	Number	0.00	0.00	Projects		
C4.1 - Number of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the	Number	0.00	18.00	Projects		
total number of consulates						
C4.2 - Percentage of consulates developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund out of the	%	0.00	78.00	Projects		
total number of consulates						

Specific objective	2 - Borders			
Indicator	Measurement Baseline		Target value	Source of data
	unit	value		
C1.1 - Number of staff trained in borders management related aspects with the help	Number	0.00	955.00	Projects
of the Fund				
C1.2 - Number of training courses in borders management related aspects with the	Number	0.00	80.00	Projects
help of the Fund				
C2 - Number of border control (checks and surveillance) infrastructure and means	Number	0.00	1,300.00	Projects
developed or upgraded with the help of the Fund				
C3.1 - Number of border crossings of the external borders through ABC gates	Number	0.00	1,095,000.00	Projects
supported from the Fund				
C3.2 - Total number of border crossings	Number	0.00	54,000,000.00	Projects
C4 - Number of national border surveillance infrastructure established/further	Number	0.00	0.00	Projects
developed in the framework of EUROSUR				
C5 - Number of incidents reported by the Member State to the European Situational	Number	0.00	4,000.00	National Situational
Picture				Picture

Specific objective	5 - Preventing and combating crime			
Indicator	Measurement	Baseline	Target value	Source of
	unit	value		data
C1 - Number of JITs and EMPACT operational projects supported by the Fund, including the	Number	0.00	0.00	Projects
participating Member States and authorities				
C2.1 - Number of law enforcement officials trained on cross-border-related topics with the help of	Number	0.00	183.00	Projects
the Fund				
C2.2 - Duration of the training (carried out) on cross-border related topics with the help of the fund	Person days	0.00	3,500.00	Projects
C3.1 - Number of projects in the area of crime prevention	Number	0.00	18.00	Projects
C3.2 - Financial value of projects in the area of crime prevention	EUR	0.00	12,500,000.00	Projects
C4 - Number of projects supported by the Fund, aiming to improve law enforcement information	Number	0.00	0.00	Projects
exchanges which are related to Europol data systems, repositories or communication tools (e.g.				
data loaders, extending access to SIENA, projects aiming to improving input to analysis work files				
etc.)				

Specific objective	6 - Risks and cris	sis			
Indicator	Measurement	Baseline	Target	Source	of
	unit	value	value	data	
C1 - Number of tools put in place or upgraded with the help of the Fund to facilitate the protection	Number	0.00	218.00	Projects	
of critical infrastructure by Member States in all sectors of the economy					
C2 - Number of projects relating to the assessment and management of risks in the field of internal	Number	0.00	10.00	Projects	
security supported by the Fund				_	
C3 - Number of expert meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences, publications, websites and	Number	0.00	52.00	Projects	
(online) consultations organised with the help of the Fund					

# 6. FRAMEWORK FOR PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME BY THE MEMBER STATE

#### 6.1 Partnership involvement in the preparation of the programme

Upon the initiative of the MoI working groups based on financial instruments were created in order to identify the needs and goals in different governing areas of the state and prepare the national ISF multiannual programme for the EU budget period 2014–2020. The working groups included representatives of ministries and public sector authorities according to the respective area. As a form of organising the work of the working groups it was decided to use meetings and electronic exchange of information via the mailing list of the group. The authorities involved in the working groups made proposals, from which the actions corresponding to the goals of ISF and needs of the state were chosen.

#### 6.2 Monitoring committee

In order to support the implementation of ISF a Monitoring Committee will be created, which is composed of high officials of the Ministry of the Interior and representatives of the beneficiaries. Monitoring Committee will be assigned the task of assessing project proposals and proposals for making amendments during project implementation presented by the final beneficiaries. If necessary, the Monitoring Committee will assess the level of success of implementing the ISF, make proposals for increasing effectiveness of implementation and decide on individual questions related to the implementation of the fund. The composition and working arrangements of the committee will be described in more detail in the rules established for internal implementation of the fund.

#### 6.3 Common monitoring and evaluation framework

The system for monitoring and evaluation of the ISF implementation will be based on the rules established by the European Commission aimed at the development of common monitoring and evaluation framework.

First level monitoring concerning the final beneficiaries is performed through reporting and on-the-spot controls by the responsible authority for the implementation of the fund, Foreign Financing Department of the Ministry of the Interior. Second level control is performed by the Financial Department of the Ministry of the Interior. The audit authority performs audits and on-the-spot controls.

During the evaluation of implementing the fund, assessment experts who are independent from the responsible and the audit authority and base the evaluation on guidelines of the European Commission are used. The responsible authority ensures the collection of data (incl. indicators) required for evaluation.

The information related to monitoring and evaluation will be described in more detail in the rules established for domestic implementation of the fund.

#### 6.4 Partnership involvement in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the national programme

Partners are involved during preparation, implementation and evaluation stages of the ISF multi-annual programme. Involvement of partners is based on internal rules and practices. During the preparation of the programme, ministries and public sector authorities that are potential final beneficiaries were involved.

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During implementation and evaluation the partners involved will be ministries and, where necessary, experts. When partners are selected, the possibility of conflict of interest is prevented at all stages (preparation, implementation and evaluation).

# 6.5 Information and publicity

Estonia will ensure that a website or a website portal is provided with information on and access to the national programme; inform potential beneficiaries about funding opportunities under the national programme; and publicise to Union citizens the role and achievements of the Specific Regulations through information and communication actions on the results and impact of the national programme.

Estonia will ensure transparency on the implementation of the national programme and maintain a list of actions supported by each national programme which will be accessible through the website or the website portal.

Further information and publicity actions may also be carried out during the course of the programme.

#### 6.6 Coordination and complementarity with other instruments

ISF support will be allocated for actions that are generally not eligible for financing from other financial instruments of the EU. Nonetheless, during drafting of the actions in the programme, planning of the structural funds of the EU was followed in order to prevent overlapping, e.g. European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. When a project application is submitted, the responsible authority determines from which project of a similar area the final beneficiary has previously received support, or whether the final beneficiary is applying for it in the future.

#### 6.7 Beneficiaries

6.7.1 List of main types of beneficiaries of the programme:

State/federal authorities

Non-Governmental organisations

Education/research organisations

# 6.7.2 Direct award (if applicable)

The responsible authority allocates the support directly, if the nature of the project requires, or if the project can be realised only by the state authority which based on its technical expertise and administrative powers has the required competence and holds a monopoly position. The reason for direct award of the support is added to the financing decision.

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#### 7. THE FINANCING PLAN OF THE PROGRAMME

#### **Table 1: Financing plan ISF-Borders**

Specific objective / national objective	Total
SO1.NO1 National capacity	690,000.00
SO1.NO2 Union acquis	112,500.00
SO1.NO3 Consular cooperation	
TOTAL NO SO1 Support a common visa policy	802,500.00
SO1.SA1 Consular cooperation	
TOTAL SO1 Support a common visa policy	802,500.00
SO2.NO1 EUROSUR	5,102,039.40
SO2.NO2 Information exchange	1,250,625.00
SO2.NO3 Common Union standards	525,000.00
SO2.NO4 Union acquis	517,500.00
SO2.NO5 Future challenges	
SO2.NO6 National capacity	26,827,457.27
TOTAL NO SO2 Borders	34,222,621.67
SO2.SA2 FRONTEX equipment	1,211,619.60
TOTAL SO2 Borders	35,434,241.27
TOTAL SO3 Operating support	0.00
Technical assistance borders	1,589,087.60
TOTAL	37,825,828.87

(1) The amount under SO2 / NO6 includes an envelope of EUR 6 412 600 to be spent in accordance with Article 64(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 2017/2226. This specific allocation can support 100% of those costs (including costs of operating the system) and is provided exclusively for this purpose. It cannot be used to cover other needs/costs, including those referred to in subparagraphs a) to g) of article 64(2) and article 64(3). This specific allocation shall not be taken into consideration in the calculation that determines the percentage of funding that may be used to finance operating support, according to Article 10 (1) of Regulation (EU) No 515/2014.

(2) The amount under SO2 / NO6 includes an envelope of EUR 3 216 666,66 that shall be used to support exclusively the costs incurred by Member States in accordance with Article 85(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1240. Such costs can be fully supported (up to 100%) by this extra allocation. This extra allocation cannot be used to cover other costs, including those referred to in Article 85(2) points a) to d) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1240, as well as ETIAS' operating costs.

(3) The amount under SO2 / NO6 includes an envelope of EUR 1 227 000 that shall be used to support the costs incurred by Member States for the quick and effective upgrading of the national components of the SIS, in line with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1861. Such costs can be fully supported (up to 100%) by this extra allocation.

Specific objective / national objective	Total
SO5.NO1 C - prevention and combating	6,772,771.05
SO5.NO2 C - exchange of information	2,504,515.00
SO5.NO3 C - training	457,500.00
SO5.NO4 C - victim support	63,750.00
SO5.NO5 C - threat and risk assessment	
TOTAL SO5 Preventing and combating crime	9,798,536.05
SO6.NO1 R - prevention and combating	817,500.00
SO6.NO2 R - exchange of information	
SO6.NO3 R - training	187,500.00
SO6.NO4 R - victim support	
SO6.NO5 R - infrastructure	2,377,623.55
SO6.NO6 R - early warning and crisis	983,485.95
SO6.NO7 R - threat and risk assessment	315,000.00
TOTAL SO6 Risks and crisis	4,681,109.50
Technical assistance police	874,013.45
TOTAL	15,353,659.00

#### Table 3: Total annual EU commitments (in €)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL
ISF-Borders	0.00	5,086,042.00	4,756,045.00	3,523,198.00	9,647,431.59	8,810,470.33	6,002,641.95	37,825,828.87
ISF-Police	0.00	3,039,804.00	2,589,559.00	4,062,585.00	1,887,237.00	1,887,237.00	1,887,237.00	15,353,659.00

# Justification for any deviation from the minimum shares set in the Specific Regulations

ETIAS, EES and SIS top-up will be used for SO2 NO6 in line with the EU regulations, therefore the programme will deviate from the threshold of minimum 5% for SO1 NO3+SO2 NO2+SO2 NO3.

# DOCUMENTS

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	Document title	Document type	Document date	Local reference	<b>Commission reference</b>	Files	Sent date	Sent By

#### LATEST VALIDATION RESULTS

Severity	Code	Message
Info		Programme version has been validated.
Warning	2.15	New EC decision is required for versions > 1. New EC decision is required when fields belonging to the EC decision are modified/added/removed. These fields are all fields except those used in the Authorities section and the Management and Control System field. For the Financial Plan, amounts within a Specific Objective can be modified without the need for a new EC Decision, as long as the total per Specific Objective stays the
Warning	2.24.3	same. SO1.NO3 (Consular cooperation) + SO2.NO2 (Information exchange) + SO2.NO3 (Common Union standards) (1,775,625.00) should be minimum 5 % of Total Borders Allocation (NOSO1 + NOSO2 + NOSO3 + TA)
wanning	2.27.3	(1,891,291.44).